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To state that Miranda v. Arizona' opened new problem areas
for peace officers, courts, and attorneys would be a gross under-
statement. Rather than delving deeply into factual situations to
determine the voluntariness of statements made to law enforce-
ment officers, courts must now determine whether the statements
sought to be introduced at trial are the products of "custodial
interrogation." If so, the Miranda holding comes into play.
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held:
[Tihe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpa-
tory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.
2
As to the "procedural safeguards" to protect the right against
self-incrimination, the Court held that the now famous Miranda
warnings must be given, "unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right to silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it . . .3
The question of what constitutes custodial interrogation is an
* B.A., Furman University; J.D., University of South Carolina; Member of the South
Carolina Bar, Carter, Philpot, and Johnson, Greenville, S.C.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 444.
3. Id.
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extremely broad one, and no attempt will be made to comprehen-
sively develop every detail and peripheral aspect of the problem.'
The emphasis of the discussion will be on the tests which courts
have developed and the application of these tests to the most
common categories of factual situations. As a preliminary matter,
it will be necessary to mention briefly the meaning of interroga-
tion.- The next matter to be considered will be the tests used by
the courts, followed by the application of these tests to factual
situations. The factual situations include interrogation: 1) "on
the scene," 2) at the home or business of the subject, and 3) in a
building or a vehicle maintained by the state for purposes of
investigation or custody. The conclusion represents an attempt to
relate the trends noted to the purposes of the Miranda decision.
Before considering the nature of custodial interrogation, it is
necessary to develop briefly an overview of the basic purposes of
Miranda. Only with such purposes in mind can the various issues
involved in the application of Miranda be intelligently ap-
proached. Of course, the basic aim is to "secure the privilege
against self-incrimination."' This protection may be achieved by
the execution of the four general, somewhat overlapping purposes
of Miranda.
First, in order to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court held that affirmative steps must be
taken to overcome "the compelling atmosphere of the interroga-
tion."7 The theory is that
[elven without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or
[other coercive practices], the very fact of custodial interroga-
tion exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the
weakness of individuals.'
Thus, even though the individual is not forced to speak, the na-
4. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1969). This annotation, one hundred thirty-
one pages in length, treats numerous peripheral areas not to be considered in this article.
These areas include: testimony before grand juries; interrogation by prison personnel;
interrogation by private security guards, detectives or police, business proprietors, or
medical personnel; and questioning by relatives, friends, or acquaintances of the subject,
as well as by other miscellaneous persons.
5. This should not be taken to mean that the question of interrogation is a simple
one. A brief discussion of it will suffice, however, as a background for the central point of
this article.
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
7. Id. at 465.
8. Id. at 455.
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ture of the place and circumstances may overbear his will. The
natural tendency of most persons is to cooperate with the police;
this natural tendency (termed by Professor Graham as "igno-
rance compulsion") may cause a truly involuntary statement to
be elicited without any additional coercion.- Given the combina-
tion of this natural tendency and an inherently coercive police-
dominated atmosphere, the Miranda holding can be, in theory at
least, effectual in the protection of the right against self-
incrimination.
The second purpose of Miranda is to overcome the more so-
phisticated pressures on the individual to speak. Modern law
enforcement personnel are well versed in the psychological art of
eliciting conversation.'0 In addition to the problems of "ignorance
compulsion" and coercive atmosphere, the actual behavior of the
interrogators is naturally aimed at the solicitation of evidence.
There are, for example, specific ways for an interrogation room
to be furnished and arranged; specific personal traits that are
highly prized in interrogators; and specific tactics employed to
wear away the resistance of the individual. All of these proce-
dures, based on sound psychological data, are highly effective in
bringing about desired results." Thus, even without any force or
overt trickery, the individual being interrogated is placed at a
distinct disadvantage. One of the purposes of Miranda was par-
tially to rectify this imbalance of influence upon the individual.
A third purpose of Miranda is to eliminate or mitigate real
or supposed police abuses in the course of interrogation.' 2 The
term "abuses" should be taken to mean activity going far beyond
the inherently coercive atmosphere and the use of mild psycho-
logical ploys. These abuses have ranged from giving false legal
advice,'13 to lengthy pre-arraignment interrogation coupled with a
denial of the right to counsel, 4 to the hanging and whipping of
the subject.'" These practices, though previously held unconstitu-
9. Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?". California's Anticipatory Applica-
tion of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59, 79-80 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Graham].
10. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 42
(1968). This article provides a good discussion of a social science approach to the problem
of custodial interrogation.
11. Id. at 45.
12. See Outletta v. Sarver, 428 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1970).
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
15. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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tional, are further circumscribed by the necessity of Miranda
warnings and waiver.
The fourth purpose of Miranda is to protect the evidentiary
value of confessions or inculpatory statements by insuring their
voluntary nature.'" By proof that an individual knew and volun-
tarily waived his rights, the statement is at least prima facie clear
of the taint of coercion and falsehood.
The above discussion, far from being a complete exposition
of the purpose of Miranda, is only a basic outline. This outline is
given only to serve as a standard by which to measure recent
interpretations defining "custodial interrogation." To determine
whether these interpretations further or frustrate the purposes of
Miranda is the subject of this article.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION?
Perhaps the Miranda Court was reluctant to define com-
pletely "custodial interrogation" before experience revealed the
exact scope of the problem with which the definition would be
concerned." Whatever its reason, the Court did not define the
term sufficiently for the lower federal and state courts to ap-
proach it with confidence. Over the years since the landmark
decision was rendered, however, the precedents have grown
through an enormous number of cases to the point that the mat-
ter may now be approached with surety in some areas and at least
a growing confidence in others. Most of the case law centers on
the question of whether the individual was in custody at the time
the statements were made. Before consideration of that problem,
however, brief attention to the meaning of "interrogation" in the
Miranda context is in order. If the statements sought to be admit-
ted are not found to be the product of interrogation, the question
of custody should never arise.
A. Interrogation
The term "interrogation" includes the questioning of a sub-
ject by police officers with a view to obtaining information related
to his guilt or innocence in suspected criminal activity. Beyond
that core concept, perhaps interrogation can be best defined by
pointing out the major areas which are generally held not to be
16. Lunsford v. Howard, 316 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Ky. 1970).
17. See Graham, supra note 9, at 63.
[Vol. 25
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interrogation: volunteered statements and responses given to
administrative questions.
A volunteered statement, made without any attempt by
peace officers to solicit it, is not deemed to be the product of
custodial interrogation, even though an individual may be in the
most severe form of custody. 8 For example, in Cook v. Cox," a
state prisoner knew that the police were investigating the owner-
ship of an automobile found in his possession. Without any ques-
tioning, the prisoner requested to speak with a police sergeant,
voluntarily gave him a false registration card, and claimed that
he was the true owner of the vehicle. When the attempted excul-
patory l statement was determined to be false, it was admissible
against him on a charge of car theft. The statement, not being the
product of interrogation, was admissible without any requirement
of Miranda warnings. The same reasoning applies to statements
blurted out in a squad car immediately after arrest. 2' In Sellers
v. Smith,22 the defendant was placed under arrest and put in a
squad car to be driven to the station when he started a conversa-
tion with the officers by saying, "Well, you all got me."' Such a
statement is clearly admissible under the language of Miranda:
"Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding
today. 1 The same is true where the defendant believes the police
to have sufficient evidence to convict and therefore gives a full
voluntary confession without interrogation, 21 or where the defen-
dant's desire to commit a crime remains strong and he verbalizes
that desire." For example in United States v. Compton,21 the
defendant blurted out after his arrest, "I just want to kill Presi-
dent Nixoi!"2.' Clearly statements volunteered by an individual,
even though he may be in custody, are not the products of "inter-
18. United States v. Littlejohn, 441 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1971).
19. 330 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Va. 1971).
20. It is clear that exculpatory statements receive the same treatment as other state-
ments. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
21. United States v. Duke, 369 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1966).
22. 412 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Id. at 1004-05.
24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
25. United States v. De Bose, 410 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
920 (1971).
26. United States v. Compton, 428 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920
(1971).
27.1. Id. at 20.
1974]
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rogation" as defined by the courts.
An area which is less clear than that of volunteered state-
ments, but generally held not to be interrogation, is the area of
administrative questioning. The term "administrative question-
ing" is used to describe the routine questions asked to all individ-
uals who are "booked" or otherwise processed by officers.2
Miranda does not apply to administrative questioning, as it gen-
erally applies only to interrogation designed to elicit admissions
of a crime, or to the type questions which "Mr. Justice Frank-
furter aptly characterized and proscribed. . . a long time ago in
Watts against Indiana as the 'Suction process of interroga-
tion.' "2 A good example of a situation in which incriminating
information was held admissible even though given during ad-
ministrative questioning is found in Williams v. United States."0
There the defendant was being "mugged" and fingerprinted in
the routine way. An officer was asking the usual questions neces-
sary to fill out the police forms as to name, age, residence, and
occupation. To the latter question the defendant replied that he
was a "pimp." This statement was held admissible even though
the defendant was obviously in custody. Proctor v. United
States," however, reaches a different conclusion on a similar state
of facts. In Proctor the defendant was asked his occupaton for
purposes of filling out a line-up form. His false reply was later
used for impeachment purposes at his trial.32 The court, in an
opinion written by Judge Skelly Wright, held that even innocent
questions asked in a coercive atmosphere violate the holding of
Miranda. The coercive atmosphere is the same whether or not the
officer intends to obtain incriminating statements. The defen-
dant may well believe that he must answer, and therefore his
statement may be involuntary. Moreover the intent of the officer
asking the question is irrelevant. Despite the well-reasoned opin-
ion of Judge Wright, this view has not been widely accepted. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, rejected that line of reasoning in
28. Clarke v. State, 3 Md. App. 447, 240 A.2d 291 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
29. Schwartz & Bator, Criminal Justice in the Mid-Sixties: Escobedo Revisited, 42
F.R.D. 463, 467 (1967).
30. 391 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
31. 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
32. Proctor was decided before Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which per-
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Clark v. United States3' where an individual underwent routine
questioning at a police station as to an automobile accident in
which he was involved. His answers provided evidence which was
later admitted against him on a charge of automobile theft.
Administrative questioning of this type was held not to constitute
custodial interrogation even though it took place in a typical
police-dominated atmosphere.
34
A related question is whether an individual may be legally
required to identify himself when he is, for example, involved in
an automobile accident. The possibility of self-incrimination is
clearly present if a person can be forced to identify himself as the
driver of a car which is later found to have been driven recklessly.
Although a strong argument can be made for the invocation of the
constitutional privilege, 35 the Supreme Court has held that a re-
quirement that a driver identify himself does not violate his
rights. In California v. Byers,3 the plurality and one concurring
justice held that the incidental possibility of self-incrimination
from such a requirement is not sufficient to frustrate the purpose
of a statute requiring such identification when that purpose is
completely divorced from criminal prosecution. Four of the Jus-
tices 37 went so far as to hold that self-identification is not testimo-
nial. Although the issue of this case was not custodial interroga-
tion, the reasoning of the Court could well be applied to support
the view that administrative questioning for purposes other than
soliciting incriminating statements falls outside the purview of
Miranda.
3 8
Although interrogation in its basic sense does include the
33. 400 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1036 (1969). Clark was decided
before Proctor but the same reasoning was argued and rejected.
34. Editor's note. It may be that the true distinction between Proctor and Clark turns
on the definition of "custody." In Proctor the defendant was under arrest while in Clark
the defendant had not yet been arrested. Whether emphasis is placed on the term "cus-
todial" is, however, probably more descriptive than analytical. It nonetheless remains
clear that Miranda warnings may not be required for purely administrative questioning if
the nature of the judicial inquiry is in the context of "interrogation."
35. Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 SuP. CT. REv. 103, 122
(1966).
36. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
37. Burger, C.J., Blackmun, White, and Stewart, JJ.
38. A related issue is whether an officer may ask questions in order to keep the flow
of information coming or to clarify a volunteered statement. See generally Kamisar,
"Custodial Interrogation" within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRIINAL LAW AND THE
CONsTrrUTION, 335, 351-52, 379-82 (Inst. Cont. Leg. Ed. 1968).
1974]
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normal police initiated questioning, it does not include volun-
teered statements and usually does not include routine adminis-
trative questioning.
B. Custodial
By far the most litigated issue in the field of "custodial
interrogation" is whether the defendant was in custody at the
time he was interrogated39 and gave the statements sought to be
introduced." The most frequently quoted language determinative
of this issue is that of the Miranda Court:
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signif-
icant way.4'
It is clear that the word "significant" in this context has a sub-
stantial meaning. The Court inserted this word in three different
places between the time the opinion was printed in the advance
sheets and its final publication.12 This demonstrates the error of
the view held by Judge Sobel of the New York Supreme Court
that any deprivation of freedom is inherently coercive.
4 3 Most
cases are in substantial agreement that some restraint on an indi-
vidual's freedom of action falls within the tolerances left un-
touched by Miranda. The question of how great a restriction may
be placed on an individual's freedom without invoking the neces-
sity of Miranda warnings must be decided on the facts of each
case. Miranda clearly applies to police interrogation of a person
under arrest at the police station, since this was the factual situa-
tion in Miranda and its companion cases. In order to decide the
more difficult factual issues, courts have attempted to devise
tests to determine the point at which the term "custodial" be-
comes applicable.
1. Which Test is Appropriate?
The tests which courts have discussed may be grouped into
39. Custody and interrogation are two conceptually separate requirements which
must each be met before Miranda becomes applicable.
40. See generally Lynch, Miranda, 35 FoRD. L. REv. 221, 224-27 (1966).
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
42. See 35 TENN. L. Rav. 604, 611 (1968).
43. Id. at 611.
[Vol. 25706
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two general classificatons: 1) the focus test and 2) the objec-
tive-subjective test.4
a. The Focus Test
When Miranda was decided, the courts had generally become
familiar with the "focus test" of Escobedo v. Illinois . 5 Escobedo
held that certain rights attach when the ."investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect . *..."I Being accustomed to this
test, some courts would naturally apply it to cases under
Miranda. To reinforce this tendency, Chief Justice Warren in-
cluded in Miranda the infamous "obfuscating footnote." 7 Foot-
noting the passage describing custodial interrogation the Court
stated, "[t]his is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of
an investigation which had focused on an accused."4 This foot-
note has added a great deal to the confusion, misinterpretation,
and lack of uniformity in applying Miranda.
Later cases have demonstrated that the focus test and the
deprivation of "freedom of action in any significant way" lan-
guage49 cannot logically be as coextensive as the footnote seems
to suggest. In People v. McKie"0 the defendant was under investi-
gation for murder. The investigation resulted in insufficient evi-
dence for a conviction for murder, but did produce sufficient
evidence to convict the defendant for an unrelated misdemeanor
for which he was subsequently sentenced and incarcerated. Fol-
lowing his release on the misdemeanor charge, the defendant was
intermittently followed and questioned with regard to the mur-
der. On each occasion, the defendant consulted his attorney, who
in turn advised him not to answer any questions and demanded
that questioning outside the presence of counsel cease. Finally,
fourteen months after the murder, the police followed the defen-
dant to a building. At this point the defendant approached the
police and told them that he had killed the victim, that they
would never be able to prove it, and that they might as well quit
44. The latter classification actually encompasses two general tests. However, these
must be discussed together for the sake of clarity. See text, pp. 710-14 infra.
45. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
46. Id. at 490-91.
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n. 4 (1966).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 444.
50. 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 303 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969).
1974]
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following him around. The court determined that no restraint was
put on the defendant's freedom of action.5' The holding was clear.
There was no custody. But it is likewise clear that the investiga-
tion had long since focused on the defendant at least in the
Escobedo sense, since the only purpose of the ongoing investiga-
tion was to convict the defendant.2
In spite of the logical inconsistency between the concepts of
focus and custody as evidenced by McKie, some courts have used
focus as the test for the application of Miranda.53 In Arnold v.
United States," the court held that Miranda, like Escobedo, does
not apply to the questioning of a subject before the process has
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatorial stage. In United
States v. Dickerson,55 Miranda warnings were applied to tax in-
vestigations without regard to custody. Once the tax file was
transferred to the Intelligence Division for the purpose of a crimi-
nal investigation of possible tax fraud, the warnings were required
at the first contact with the subject by an agent or special agent.
The warnings were not required, however, so long as the investi-
gation was merely civil in nature. Dickerson seems completely
illogical from a Miranda viewpoint. Under the facts of the case,
an agent came to the subject's office to make a civil investigation,
questioned him, and obtained incriminating evidence. The case
was then shifted to the Intelligence Division for a criminal inves-
tigation. A special agent returned to the defendant's office and,
in the same familiar atmosphere, questioned him. There was no
greater coercive pressure on the subject in the latter encounter
than in the former. It is highly improbable that a criminal investi-
gation which the subject believes to be a civil investigation could
be more coercive than a civil investigation." Despite this fact, the
51. Although this case was decided in terms of the right to counsel, the turning point
was the fact that the defendant could be questioned without counsel since he was not in
custody, Quaere: Is a person who is incessantly followed and questioned not restrained in
his freedom of action?
52. For a similar situation, see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968); Windsor v. United
States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Mendoza-Torres, 285 F. Supp. 629
(D. Ariz, 1968); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).
54. 382 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1967).
55. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969). For other cases dealing with the problem of the
application of Miranda to tax investigations, see: Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968); United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Mirani, 422
F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910 (1970); United States v. Lackey, 413
F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
56, This case could possibly be justified as a measure to curb abuses by the investiga-
[Vol. 25
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focus test was applied to require the warningsT
A much more logical approach to the focus problem is that
expressed by Judge Friendly in United States v. Hall." In that
case, the police, already possessing sufficient evidence for an ar-
rest, went to the subject's home. The questioning took place in
an atmosphere familiar to the individual and was found to be
non-coercive. Judge Friendly distinguished the Miranda cus-
todial test from the Escobedo focus reasoning as follows:
[C]ustody as well as focus and other factors were essential to
[the decision in Escobedo]. Under Miranda custody alone suf-
fices. We fail to perceive how one can reason from those two
propositions to a conclusion that "focus" alone is enough to
bring Miranda into play.
As Professor Kamisar has put it, "Miranda's use of 'custodial
interrogation' actually marks a fresh start in describing the
point at which the Constitutional protections begin"-Fifth
Amendment protections, that is."
The great majority of cases have, like the Second Circuit, rejected
focus as the appropriate test for the application of Miranda."
Although Judge Friendly's view seems consistent with the
language of Miranda, it gives no effect to footnote four. As stated
initially in the consideration of focus, this footnote has caused a
great many problems in determining the meaning of "custodial."
Some writers have attempted to reach an interpretation which
gives effect to both the body of the opinion and the footnote. One
possible interpretation is that focus is one of three important
factors. The first is restraint on freedom of action, thus giving
effect to the specific language of Miranda. The second factor is
the place of the interrogation, which was also clearly important
in the factual situations before the Miranda Court. The third
factor is focus, or the extent to which the police suspect the indi-
vidual of being the perpetrator of the offense."1 Although these
considerations do not form a rigid test, they have all played an
tor. See text, p. 710 infra.
57. Accord, United States v. Casias, 306 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1969) (selective
service investigation); United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. III. 1967) (tax
investigation). But see Pitman v. United States, 411 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1969).
58. 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
59. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970).
60. See text, pp. 710-14 infra.
61. See 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1031, 1051 (1968).
19741
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important, if often unarticulated, role in the decisions of various
courts. Focus may be particularly appropriate, when used in con-
junction with these other factors, to curb potential police abuses
and deception. It is repugnant to justice, in the eyes of some
courts, to allow police to delay arrest or restraint for the sole
purpose of obtaining additional evidence without imposing the
burden of Miranda warnings.1
2
Another view which attempts to correlate the focus and re-
straint on freedom aspects of custody is that 6f Professor Ken-
neth W. Graham, Jr. 3 In his view, focus should be used as a
separate point at which warning should be given if it is to be used
at all. Thus, if an individual is to be interrogated, he must be
given the warnings if: 1) he is in custody or 2) the investigation
has focused on him. 4 This view gives continuing vitality to the
rights protected by Escobedo while not diluting the Miranda re-
quirement. Moreover, Professor Graham would require the warn-
ings "whenever the police arrest or have probable cause to arrest
the person questioned . . . ."I This view would also curb the
police abuse of forestalling arrest and custody only to lull the
individual into giving evidence against himself while unaware of
his rights.
In summary, it is clear that focus alone is not the appropriate
test for the application of Miranda, despite some authority to the
contrary. If used in conjunction with, or in addition to, some other
test, the concept of focus may, however, prove a useful tool in
protecting the rights of individuals and curbing police deception.
b. The Objective and Subjective Tests
The great majority of courts have rejected focus as the test
for determining the point at which Miranda should apply. These
courts look instead to whether the individual's freedom of action
has been significantly restrained. The difficulty arises as to
whether this restraint should be measured in an objective sense
as to how the various circumstances might affect a reasonable
man, or whether a more subjective test should be devised to de-
termine if the particular individual interrogated believed himself
to be in custody. Additional aspects include the intent of the
62. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968).
63. See Graham, supra note 9.
64. Id. at 114.
65. Id. at 132.
[Vol. 25
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officer, which, if relevant at all, may also be judged by an objec-
tive or subjective standard. Although the subjective test is sup-
ported by considerable logic, the majority of courts have chosen
the objective test, which is more susceptible of proof.
The logic of a subjective test is clear. in the words of Profes-
sor LaFave:
IT]he person who honestly but unreasonably thinks he is under
arrest has been subjected to precisely the same custodial pres-
sures as the person whose belief in this regard is reasonable."
Miranda was devised primarily to protect the individual's right
against self-incrimination. If the individual is interrogated by
police officers and unreasonably believes himself compelled to
answer, the statements he makes are nonetheless damaging at
trial. An individual who is ignorant of his rights and weak-willed
might be coerced by far less pressure than that necessary to
achieve the same result with a more informed and steadfast sub-
ject. As pointed out by Rothblatt and Pitler,67 the court should
consider the effect of the circumstances on the suspect's mind,
taking into account his age, intelligence, experience, and other
factors.
This test is a subjective one because we are concerned with the
effect of questioning in the suspect's mind. Compulsion for one
may not be compulsion for another. In this context, the police-
man's intent to arrest or whether he has sufficient probable
cause to arrest is irrelevant."
United States v. Harrison" serves as a factual example of a
situation in which a subjective test would seem appropriate. In
Harrison the police came to the home of a parolee and requested
that he come to the station for questioning. Normally there is no
compulsion in such a situation, and subsequent interrogation
without restraint would generally be termed non-custodial. Pre-
sumably because of his peculiar situation as a parolee, the court
held that the subject actually believed himself compelled to coop-
erate with the police. As a result the interrogation had the same
66. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 39, 99 (1968).
67. Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers-Where Do We
Go From Here?, 42 NoTRE DAA~i LAWYER 479 (1968).
68. Id. at 485.
69. 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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coercive effect as if the individual had actually been in custody.
The court held his statements inadmissible absent the Miranda
warnings and waiver." This case seems to be in accord with other
decisions which consider the subjective belief of the defendant as
evidenced by his conduct and the surrounding circumstances."
As to the intent of the interrogating officer, the courts are in
general agreement that an undisclosed intent to arrest cannot
transform a non-custodial situation into a custodial one. For ex-
ample, in Williams v. United States,7 2 an individual stopped his
automobile voluntarily and for his own purposes. Police officers
approached him with the intent of arresting him unless he could
satisfactorily explain away evidence the police had independently
obtained. The court determined that there was no custody during
the interrogation and as a result Miranda did not apply. The
officers' undisclosed, subjective intentions were held to be irrele-
vant since they had no possible effect on the conduct of the sub-
ject. Other courts are in substantial agreement with this view.
3
An exception to this reasoning would appear to be the situation
in which an officer, already possessing probable cause to arrest,
attempts to forestall the arrest and custody to avoid the require-
ment of Miranda warnings.74 Consequently, the acts of police offi-
cers are generally judged by an objective standard.1
5
The test which has gained the widest approval among the
courts is the objective one. In United States v. Hall,7" Judge
Friendly rejected the focus test for the objective one. According
to this test, the officer must do something evidenced by his man-
ner of approach, the tone of his questions or otherwise, that would
objectively indicate that the defendant is not free to leave at
will.77
The application of this test has generally been in the familiar
language of the reasonable man standard. The California Su-
70, For a discussion of this case, see 37 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 260 (1969).
71. Hicks v. United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967); State v. Lay, 427 S.W.2d
394 (Mo. 1968).
72. 381 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 441 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1971); Lowe v. United
States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969); Ellington v. Conboy, 333 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y.
1971),
74. Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968).
75. United States v. Pellegrini, 309 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
76. 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
77. Id. at 544.
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preme Court held in People v. Arnold:78 "[Clustody occurs if the
suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable man, that he
is so deprived.""9 Likewise in United States v. Behowies," the
Ninth Circuit held that Miranda applies if the actions of the
police and the circumstances, fairly construed, would reasonably
have led the defendant to believe he could not leave freely. This
standard has been widely accepted because, in the words of the
New York Court of Appeals:
This test .. gives effect to the purpose of the Miranda rules;
it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations
of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the
police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies
of every person whom they question.'
As in many other areas of the law, the courts have found that
the workings of an individual mind are too complex to enable the
use of a truly subjective standard. Under these conditions the
courts have adopted a standard which at least approximates the
proper result in the normal case, and one which can be proven
with relative accuracy. The courts cannot be expected to decide
cases solely on the basis of self-serving statements by the defen-
dant or the interrogating officer. Beyond these factors, the most
logical considerations are the circumstances and conduct of the
individuals. Without extensive psychological analysis of each de-
fendant, the objective standard is a reasonable, although not op-
timal, solution to the problem.
The most logical test to determine whether an individual is
in custody for purposes of Miranda is that suggested in Hicks v.
United States 2 and State v. Lay." These courts would look to the
subjective impressions of the defendant and the objective intent
of the interrogating officer. This test would properly turn on
whether the particular subject felt compelled to incriminate him-
self, thus providing the logical advantages of the subjective test.
Since the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant, it can have no
effect on the subject. The only relevance of the officer's intent is
78. 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
79. Id. at 444, 426 P.2d at 521, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
80. 432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970).
81. People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 (1967).
82. 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
83. 427 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. 1968).
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its outward manifestation and its subsequent effect on the defen-
dant. 4 Despite the logical soundness of this test, it fails to con-
sider the practical problem of proof.
In summary, it would appear that the most logical test for
the application of Miranda is a subjective one centering on
whether the individual believes himself to be in custody. The
problems of proof inherent in this test often compel courts to use
a more objective standard in determining whether the subject can
be said to have reasonably believed himself to be in custody at
the time of the questioning. With the foregoing as a basic test,
the focus test could, however, be applied in two ways. First, it
could be applied to prohibit an officer with probable cause to
arrest from intentionally avoiding the use of Miranda warnings. 5
Second, focus might be appropriate to determine a separate point
in time at which the warnings should be given." If these factors
were considered with regard to the various factual situations aris-
ing under Miranda, the result would be a reasonable compromise
between the optimal logical solution and the practical necessities
of law enforcement and judicial proof.
2. Factual Situations Arising Under Miranda
Although the factual situations arising under Miranda are
numerous and diverse, the major areas of concern can be catego-
rized by reference to the place of the interrogation. The resulting
three major categories are interrogations occurring: 1) "on the
scene," 2) at the home or business of the subject, and 3) at a
building or vehicle maintained by the state for investigation or
custody (typically the police station).
a. On the Scene
There are many situations where psychologically it is very hard
to superimpose the rather formidable and formal kind of ex-
changes required by Miranda onto situations where the over-
whelming human response is quickly to say, "Who are you?
What is going on? What are you doing here?""7
The language of the Miranda opinion itself makes clear that
84. See 35 TENN. L. REv. 604, 614-15 (1968).
85. Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968).
86. See Graham, supra note 9, at 114.
87. Schwartz & Bator, supra note 29, at 474.
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the requirements of warnings and waiver do not apply to every
contact of police officers with citizens.
General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a
crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible
citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they
may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the
compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation is not necessarily present."
Thus it is clear that some on-the-scene questioning is outside the
scope of Miranda. The problem of where Miranda comes into
play, however, is not a simple one.
United States v. Hatchel9 is a representative case which
illustrates a non-custodial situation that may develop into cus-
tody. In Hatchel, an officer, observing a minor traffic violation,
stopped an automobile. At the outset, the officer asked to see the
driver's registration card and license. The individual was unable
to produce either, but he did give the officer some type of identifi-
cation and a document purporting to show the car was owned by
one of his relatives. As the questioning continued, the subject was
unable to respond correctly and began approaching the officer in
a suspicious manner. The officer then drew his gun and placed
the driver under arrest. The court held that custody began when
the pistol was drawn. All questioning preceding that act of force-
ful restraint was deemed to be general on-the-scene investigation.
The incorrect answers were therefore admissible at trial for auto-
mobile theft without the requirements of warning or waiver. The
more incriminating statements that were elicited as the question-
ing was continued and before Miranda warnings were given, were
held inadmissible.
A similar case is Utsler v. Erickson,9 in which an officer
stopped a car answering the description of a getaway car in a
recent robbery. The officer asked the identity and recent wherea-
bouts of the driver. The answers to these questions were held
admissible without the Miranda warnings. The court termed the
interrogation as general questioning necessary to free quickly the
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
89. 329 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1971); accord, Ellington v. Conboy, 333 F. Supp. 1318
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
90. 440 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971).
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innocent and therefore outside the definition of custodial inter-
rogation.
Another good example of the distinction between custodial
and non-custodial on-the-scene investigation is Allen v. United
States." When the officer arrived on the scene, he found a beaten
man lying in the back seat of a car. The officer asked the victim
who had beaten him, whereupon he mumbled unintelligibly and
pointed to another passenger. This man was unable to produce
any identification. When asked if he had beaten the victim, he
answered that he had. This questioning was held to be on-the-
scene fact finding and therefore admissible as the result of non-
custodial interrogation. In a later proceeding in the same case,92
new evidence was introduced to the effect that the questioning
had actually lasted ten minutes. On the basis of this evidence, the
court reversed its earlier holding. Thus, the length of the interro-
gation transformed an otherwise non-custodial situation into a
custodial one.
Another variation of on-the-scene questioning is evident in
'United States v. Miles. 3 In that case, federal officers were investi-
gating possible liquor law violations. When they arrived at the
site of the moonshine operation, the backwoods entrepreneur ac-
costed them with a gun. Before physically subduing Miles and
taking his gun, one of the officers asked, "What do you mean-
trying to shoot someone?"'' The bootlegger replied, "I thought
you were trying to hijack my still!'"3.2 This statement was held
admissible in a subsequent prosecution for impeding the investi-
gation. The court was unwilling to require strict adherence to
Miranda in this type of "emergency" situation, even though the
defendant was obviously facing physical restraint.
The general rule that on-the-scene investigation does not
constitute custodial interrogation is now universally recognized. 4
An individual may, however, be placed in custody outside the
91. 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
92. Allen v. United States, 404 F.2d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
93, 440 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1971).
93.1. Id. at 1176.
93.2. Id.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1060 (1972); United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1011 (1971); United States v. Chase, 414 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 920 (1969); United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968); Arnold v.
United States, 382 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1967); Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.
1967); People v. McLean, 6 Cal. App. 3d 300, 85 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1970); Gauido v. State, 1
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station house and interrogation while in such custody is prohib-
ited without the proper warnings. The most obvious situation
involving on-the-scene custodial interrogation is illustrated by
Noel v. State.5 In that case an officer was conducting an investi-
gation at the scene of a crime and saw the defendant walking
nearby. The officer stopped the man at gunpoint, searched him,
and questioned him concerning the crime. This man was under
severe restraint and the court so held. No statements were admis-
sible without Miranda warnings.
Other examples of on-the-scene custodial interrogation are
United States v. De La Cruz9" and People v. Ryff. 9Y In De La Cruz,
several individuals were taken by four officers to an interrogation
room at an airport where they were questioned. The defendant
was then separated from the group, frisked and questioned. In
Ryff, a suspected shoplifter was interrogated at length in a closed
room of the department store by a store detective and a police
officer. In both cases, the statements obtained from such interro-
gation were ruled inadmissible, as the freedom of movement of
the subjects was severely restricted. 8 Other courts generally agree
that where the subject is moved from the place of the initial
encounter for the purpose of a more intensive investigation, the
subsequent interrogation is likely to be custodial,99 even if the
move is not to a police station.
In situations in which an officer uses a weapon'10 or takes the
subject to another area of the "scene" for interrogation,10' the
questioning may be deemed custodial. Miranda, however, is not
limited to these facts. In People v. Reason,'2 the defendants were
surrounded on the street by three policemen and questioned. Al-
though no force was used, the court held that the defendants'
freedom was sufficiently restricted to justify the requirement of
warnings and the statements were held inadmissible. In People
95. 274 N.E.2d 245 (Ind. 1971).
96. 420 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970).
97. 28 App. Div. 2d 1112, 284 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1967).
98. The reasoning of the court in De La Cruz suggests a subjective test, emphasizing
that the defendant was poor, uneducated, and did not speak English.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Salinas, 439 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1971).
100. United States v. Hatchel, 329 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1971); Noel v. State, 274
N.E.2d 245 (Ind. 1971).
101. United States v. De La Cruz, 420 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970); People v. Ryff, 28
App. Div. 2d 1112, 284 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1967).
102. 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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v. A bbott,03 a situation with significantly less restraint was held
to be custodial by the California Supreme Court. A police officer
had been informed that a certain individual had drugs in his
pocket. The officer walked up to the subject in a public park and
asked the man what he had in his pocket. After repeating the
question, the subject promptly answered and produced the in-
criminating evidence. The decision seems to be based on the
theory that an officer should not be allowed to forestall arrest
solely to elicit incriminating statements. This interpretation is
reinforced by the remarkably similar case of People v. McLean, 4
decided by the same court soon after Abbott. In McLean, the
police officer acted merely on suspicion, whereas the officer in the
former case arguably had probable cause. In McLean, the state-
ment was held to be admissible. It is clear that a variety of cir-
cumstances may cause an otherwise general, non-custodial inter-
rogation at the scene to become custodial.
Although it is impossible to set down any hard and fast rule
to determine which types of on-the-scene questioning will be al-
lowed without Miranda warnings, some general observations may
be made. First, routine questions to determine identity, car own-
ership, and recent whereabouts are seldom, if ever, custodial. If
improper answers are given to these questions, an officer may be
justified in asking further questions of a general investigatory
nature. If the officer restrains the subject by use of a weapon or
if several officers surround him, Miranda should apply. Likewise,
if the subject, in order to facilitate the questioning, is taken to
another place (even though part of the scene of the initial encoun-
ter) the warnings should be given. In this area the courts have
generally used an objective test to determine whether freedom of
action is restricted. The displeasure of courts with the tactic of
delaying arrest for the purpose of eliciting self-incriminating
statements is also noticeable, although usually unarticulated. It
is interesting to note, however, that the courts have been gener-
ally unconcerned with the proposition that many individuals be-
lieve they must cooperate with the police despite the fact that
"ignorance compulsion" may be just as strong on the street as in
the station house, even though "coercion compulsion" is not."5
103. 3 Cal. App. 3d 966, 84 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1970).
104. 6 Cal. App. 3d 300, 85 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1970).
105. See Graham, supra note 9, at 83.
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b. In the Suspect's Home or Business
The decisions are fairly uniform that, absent formal arrest,
no custodial interrogation results from questioning the defendant
in his own home."0 6 This rule of thumb may be applied to the
office or business of a defendant as well. The general theory is
that the individual questioned is in familiar surroundings and
does not face the same pressures as in the unfamiliar, police-
dominated surroundings of the station house.'"'
An extreme example of refusing to find custodial interroga-
tion is United States v. Davis. ' Although this case is not consis-
tent with a subsequent United States Supreme Cburt decision,10 1
it is instructive as to the early interpretation of Miranda by many
courts. In Davis, customs officials boarded a ship on its arrival
in a United States port. They searched the room where the defen-
dant was quartered, found a quantity of illegal drugs, and contin-
ued the search. When the defendant requested permission to use
the restroom, he was allowed to do so only under the close obser-
vation of a customs official. In all, the questioning and detention
lasted approximately one and one-quarter hours. The investiga-
tors went ashore to procure an arrest warrant and returned. With-
out showing the warrant, the customs officials further questioned
the defendant and obtained incriminating statements. After the
statements were completed, cautionary warnings were given. The
elicited statements were held to be admissible, even though the
court recognized the fact that the defendant had been detained.
The detention was held to be insufficient for the application of
Miranda. The court apparently felt that Miranda should never be
applied to any dwelling quarters of an individual. If this were not
the reasoning of the court, it is unclear what type of restraint
would suffice to make such interrogation custodial-short of the
hanging and whipping that occurred in Brown v. Mississippi. 0
A more recent example of non-custodial interrogation in the
suspect's home is United States v. Lacy,"' in which F.B.I. agents
106. 37 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 260, 273 (1969).
107. This theory also applies generally to an individual questioned in the home of a
third party. It is obvious, however, that the surroundings of a third party's home might
be less familiar and more coercive than those of the defendant's own home. For a discus-
sion of this issue see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 606-13 (1969).
108. 259 F. Supp. 496 (D. Mass. 1966). See also 18 W. Ras. L. REv. 1777 (1967).
109. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
110. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
111. 446 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1971).
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went to an individual's home to investigate a possible car theft.
There was no coercive activity; the subject freely answered all
questions as to ownership of the car; and the agents left pleas-
antly. When the agents found that the information given them
was false, the defendant was arrested and brought to trial. The
statements were admissible without Miranda warnings as the re-
sult of non-custodial interrogation. Decisions on similar facts are
apparently uniform in their agreement with Lacy."2 The same
result has been reached where the accused was living in a hotel
room."'
Some courts have refused to make a finding of custodial in-
terrogation at the defendant's home even when the police were in
fact using considerable force at the time the statements were
made. In United States v. Dunnings,"4 the verbal exchange took
place while the police were breaking down the door of the defen-
dant's home. In State v. Lane,"- four police officers rushed into
the home of an armed robbery suspect with drawn revolvers and
promptly put him in handcuffs. One officer had begun to inform
the suspect of his Miranda rights when another interrupted and
asked if the defendant had the gun. The incriminating answer
that resulted was held to be admissible, since the police had a
right to protect themselves from the defendant. Since it is diffi-
cult to imagine one man in handcuffs surrounded by four officers
with drawn revolvers as being a serious threat to the safety of the
officers, it would seem that the Lane court did not favor a broad
interpretation of custodial interrogation, at least with regard to
at-home questioning.
Two cases that appear to be more reasonable in their decision
are People v. Stansberry"' and McMillan v. United States.1 7 In
McMillan, federal officers went to a man's home and told him
they were looking for a liquor still. He replied that the still was
not on his property. The statement was admissible as the result
of a general investigatory question in a non-coercive atmosphere.
The same reasoning was applied in Stansberry when police offi-
cers entered a student association office with a search warrant.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969); McMillan v. United
States, 399 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1968).
113. United States v. Welsh, 417 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1969).
114. 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970).
115. 77 Wash. 2d 860, 467 P.2d 304 (1970).
116. 47 II. 2d 541, 268 N.E.2d 431 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1972).
117. 399 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1968).
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In answer to a preliminary question as to the ownership of the
clothing strewn around the room, the defendant answered that
the trenchcoat belonged to him. When drugs were found in the
coat, the statement was admissible against the defendant. Courts
have generally agreed that Miranda was not intended to cover
these situations.
It is clear, however, that Miranda does apply to some interro-
gation in the home or business of the suspect. The United States
Supreme Court made this point clear in Orozco v. Texas."' Police
officers went to Orozco's house at four a.m. and questioned him
about a shooting. The Court concluded that he was not free to
leave and that the familiar surroundings of his own room did not
purge the questioning of its custodial nature. The Court was em-
phatic in its holding that Miranda was not limited to the station
house but applied anywhere the defendant was in custody."'
The same reasoning applies to the defendant's place of busi-
ness. If the questioning there is custodial, Miranda warnings are
required. In United States v. Phelps,"' police officers questioned
a pawnbroker in his own shop. The officers went to the shop
already possessing probable cause to arrest. The pawnbroker was
aware of that fact. During the course of the questioning, the
pawnbroker displayed to the police some incriminating real evi-
dence and made several incriminating statements. These state-
ments were inadmissible because the situation was deemed to be
custodial. All parties involved understood from the outset that
the defendant was not free to leave. The familiar pawnshop did
not transform the interrogation into a non-custodial conversation.
An even more obvious case of custodial interrogation was
considered by the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Paulin.2' In that case, the police were summoned to the defen-
dant's home by her son, who suspected that the defendant's hus-
band had been murdered. Upon arriving at the house, the police
soon found the decomposed body of the defendant's husband in
her closet. After this discovery, the officers questioned the defen-
dant for twenty minutes, and repeated certain questions several
times to obtain information. The statements elicited under these
conditions were inadmissible due to the failure of the officers to
118. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
119. For a more thorough examination of Orozco, see 21 BAYLOR L. Rav. 290 (1969).
120. 443 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1971).
121. 25 N.Y.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d 164, 306 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1969).
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give warnings. Under any test imaginable, both the officers and
defendant believed that she was under arrest, since she was
hardly in a position to claim that a rotting body in her closet had
not at least drawn her attention to the possibility of foul play.
In United States v. Bekowies, " the court explicitly held that
a man might be held in custody in his own home, if he reasonably
believes himself to be in custody. F.B.I. agents had a warrant for
the arrest of a fugitive whom they believed to be hiding in the
Bekowies' apartment. Mr. Bekowies was aware that the apart-
ment was under continuous surveillance. On the day in question,
agents came to the door of the apartment, showed a warrant to
Bekowies, informed him of the laws against harboring a fugitive,
and asked permission to search the apartment. Permission was
granted to search all of the apartment except the bedroom, where
Mrs. Bekowies was sick in bed. After persistent questioning, Mr.
Bekowies made incriminating statements and allowed the agents
to search the bedroom, where the fugitive was found. The state-
ments were held inadmissible due to the fact that no warnings
had been given.lu The defendant had reasonably believed himself
to be in custody since he had been under surveillance, had been
warned several times of the criminal penalties for harboring fugi-
tives, and had been interrogated at length. Similar reasoning was
applied in Commonwealth v. Sites, 12 in which the defendant was
taken to his home for questioning under circumstances which
would lead a reasonable man to believe he was in custody.lu
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that there are many
circumstances under which the general rule allowing questioning
at the subject's home or business does not apply. Generally, if the
circumstances are such as to induce a reasonable man to believe
that he is in custody, the warnings must be given. Important
factors in this determination include the amount of evidence
which the subject knows the officers to have, the force used to
detain the subject, and the intensity and specificity of the ques-
tioning. It would appear that, absent a strong showing of these
factors, many courts would tend to find an absence of custody.
122. 432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970).
123. The question of whether consenting to a search is within the meaning of Miranda
is not within the scope of this discussion.
124. 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967).
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c. At the Police Station'2 6
Miranda and its companion cases were concerned with inter-
rogation in the police-dominated atmosphere of the station house.
It is clear that this is the place where the greatest danger of
coercion exists. In response to this danger, most courts appear
more favorably inclined to make a finding of custody in a station
house than in any other location. Although several writers have
suggested that all police station interrogations are custodial,' 27
this view has never been accepted. Professor Graham wrote:
If one assumes that the interrogation requirement is met, it
seems quite likely that all stationhouse [sic] interrogations will
be held to be custodial in nature whether the suspect came of
his own accord, or at the suggestion of a parent, attorney, or
military superior.'2
This opinion, however, was based on the belief that the emphasis
of Miranda was on the place of questioning-not on the fact of
arrest.' 29 Professor Graham's forecast of how courts would react
to Miranda has proved erroneous.
Of course, the general rule is that a suspect arrested and
taken to the station for questioning must be given his warnings.
Beyond that general proposition, the application of Miranda
depends in large measure on the manner in which the individual
came to the police station. The cases may be divided generally
into three categories: a) the suspect comes to the station without
any encouragement from the police; b) the suspect is in custody
on another charge; and c) the suspect is "invited" by the police
or told that he can leave at will. Throughout all of these situa-
tions, it should be remembered that administrative questioning,
even in severe custody, is not generally deemed to be interroga-
tion and therefore Miranda does not apply.'30
126. As the title of this section, the term "police station" is used in a comprehensive
sense to denote any building or vehicle maintained by the state for investigation or cus-
tody of those suspected or convicted of criminal activity. The difference in application of
Miranda to custody at facilities other than the local station house will be noted briefly
infra.
127. See, e.g., Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 69, at 484; Graham, supra note 9, at
82-83.
128. Graham, supra note 9, at 82.
129. Id. at 82-83.
130. See pp. 704-06 supra.
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i. The individual who comes to the station without any
encouragement
In general, questioning which occurs after an individual has
come voluntarily to the station and initiated the contact is found
to be non-custodial. In People v. Peterson,31 the police seized a
car when the driver was arrested for drunken driving. Subsequent
investigation disclosed that the automobile had been stolen. At
this point, a man unknown to the police walked into the station
to claim the automobile. When questioned as to whether he
owned' the car, the subject gave answers that were admissible
against him on a charge of grand theft. The California Supreme
Court held that Miranda warnings were not necessary in this case
because the officer had only questioned the subject generally
about a matter which the subject had first mentioned. No cus-
tody was found. This decision would seem reasonable, since a
man who would walk into a police station to claim a car he had
previously stolen certainly would not be coerced by questioning
related to his claimed ownership. To require Miranda warnings
in such a situation would be tantamount to requiring that every
person entering the station be given warnings before being al-
lowed to speak. A similar case is that of Hicks v. United States,3 '
in which a woman contacted the police to report a crime.'33 The
police officers, trying to find some indication as to who might
have committed the crime, questioned her as a witness only. Sud-
denly, the woman broke down and confessed. The questioning
was held to be non-custodial even though it took place at the
station house.
Cases in which questioning at the station was held to be non-
custodial are not limited to situations in which the subject makes
a gross error of judgment. In United States v. Austin,'34 the defen-
dant was aware that the police were investigating a matter con-
cerning him. Apparently trying to clear himself, he went volun-
tarily to the station taking a friend along for moral support.
Under these circumstances, the incriminating statements he gave
were admissible without Miranda warnings. Similarly, in Posey
131. 251 Cal. App. 2d 676, 59 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1967).
132, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
133. In this case, the woman actually telephoned to report the crime and was re-
quested to come to the station to give a more detailed report. The important point is,
however, that contact with the police was freely and voluntarily undertaken by the
woman.
134. 448 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971).
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v. United States, 3 a Ku Klux Klansman, who was later linked
to the murder of three civil rights workers, voluntarily went to the
motel room of F.B.I. agents for the purpose of discussing Klan
activities in general. Upon his arrival, he was told that he could
leave if he wished and that he had a right to remain silent. The
Klansman chose to speak and, in the course of the conversation,
incriminated himself. The necessity for full Miranda warnings
was rejected by the court. The subject, although outnumbered by
F.B.I. agents and in unfamiliar surroundings, had initiated the
contact and had clearly spoken without coercion or custody. The
same result was reached when a man initiated proceedings to gain
conscientious objector classification from his selective service
board and was later charged with draft evasion. The evidence
which resulted from his initial contact with the government offi-
cials was held admissible without Miranda warnings. 3 '
For questioning at a police station to become custodial in a
situation where the individual has voluntarily come to the police,
an extremely strong factual case would have to be established.
Although not articulated in the decisions, the equities of the situ-
ation are obviously important. When a person, knowing himself
to be guilty of a crime, comes to the police station to give informa-
tion about that crime, it must be assumed that he has made a
calculated decision to attempt to mislead the police. He has con-
sidered the risk of self-incrimination and deemed it to be less
important than the possibility of clearing himself. Under these
circumstances, few courts would be solicitous of his rights. More-
over, the courts realize that to require Miranda warnings before
questioning all witnesses or others who are not the subject of an
investigation would inhibit citizen cooperation with the police.
ii. The individual who is in custody on another charge' 37
One of the leading cases in this area is Mathis v. United
States,3 ' in which the subject was a prisoner in a state jail. While
in custody, the prisoner was questioned by federal agents as part
135. 416 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970).
136. United States v. Norman, 413 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1018 (1970).
137. A detailed analysis of the rights of confined persons is beyond the scope of this
discussion. Only three cases will be cited to give a general overview of the area. The
question of when Miranda warnings must be given to inmates in the normal correctional
situation will not be considered.
138. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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of a routine tax investigation. No criminal proceedings had been
instituted against him for tax fraud. Although a major portion of
the case dealt with whether Miranda warnings were appropriate
in tax investigations, the government raised an important ques-
tion as to custody. First, the prisoner was not in unfamiliar sur-
roundings as is typical of a normal police station interrogation.
Second, the prisoner was not in custody with reference to the
specific tax investigation. The United States Supreme Court re-
jected both of the government's arguments. The defendant was
severely restrained in his freedom of action and was in a com-
pletely police-dominated atmosphere. Consequently the state-
ments he made to the agents were inadmissible without Miranda
warnings.
A case which seems to be inconsistent with Mathis is Gascar
v. United States.'30 In Gascar, the court agreed that an individual
questioned in a general investigatory way about a crime is not
required to hear or waive his rights, even though he is in custody
on another charge. The court's decision emphasized the fact that
the questioning was in regard to crimes which were still in the
investigatory stage. Thus, Gascar is vulnerable to attack both as
being inconsistent with Mathis and also as relying on the discred-
ited focus test.
A recent case involving the rights of individuals in custody
is Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller,' which
grew out of the widely publicized disturbances in Attica, New
York. There were a number of issues involved in the case, but the
one with which this discussion is concerned relates to a special
rule which attorneys for the inmates sought to fashion in order to
protect the inmates' rights.' After the disturbance was quelled,
a team of state investigators, headed by Deputy Attorney General
Robert E. Fischer was sent to investigate all crimes growing out
of the riot. The attorneys bringing suit had previously represented
several of the inmates and now sought to represent them as a
group in connection with the interrogation.
The attorneys requested that all interrogation of prisoners be
enjoined, except in the presence of an attorney or after consulta-
tion with an attorney. The state maintained that, so long as the
inmates were informed of their rights and voluntarily waived
139. 356 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 865 (1966).
140. 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
141. Id. at 22.
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them, the questioning was completely proper. In response to this
argument, the attorneys pointed out that inmates were in an
especially precarious position insofar as waiver of rights was con-
cerned:
[Their failure to furnish information in response to in-
quiries by the state representatives may result in administrative
reprisals in the form of denial of parole eligibility, loss of good
time, or denial of privileges within Attica.'
The court acknowledged a possible danger to the rights of the
inmates in the following language:
In the last analysis, the situation here is unique in that plain-
tiffs, being prisoners, are at the mercy of their keepers, many of
whom, on the testimony below, have already subjected inmates
to barbarous abuse and mistreatment.1 3
As demonstrated by the above language, the situation in a correc-
tional facility can impose a special degree of danger on the exer-
cise of fifth amendment rights. Perhaps additional protections,
such as consultation with an attorney before waiver, should be
required.
The court did not reject this theory lightly. Instead, it em-
phasized the peculiar facts of the case. The correctional officers
were not carrying out the interrogation, thus they would not know
which inmates invoked their constitutional rights. Furthermore,
the superintendent of the prison gave sworn testimony that there
would be no reprisals for the invocation of inmates' rights, and
the state parole board had previously demonstrated by affirma-
tive action that no inmate's parole would be affected by his re-
fusal to answer questons. The Deputy Attorney General in charge
of the investigation had distributed a written warning of the right
to counsel to each inmate well in advance of the interrogation and
full Miranda warnings were given immediately preceding the
questioning of each individual. Finally, the prison authorities had
provided attorneys with space to interview approximately twenty
inmates per day, despite the limited usable space available in the
prison. Thus, the court, rather than finding the theory of the
plaintiffs unreasonable, found it unnecessary in this case.
The general rule, as shown by Mathis, is that an individual
142. Id.
143. Id. at 23.
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in custody must be given Miranda warnings before interrogation,
even if the interrogation is unrelated to the charge for which the
custody is imposed. Attica, while finding against the plaintiffs on
the facts of that case, indicates that the extraordinarily coercive
atmosphere of a correctional facility may require a higher stan-
dard for the waiver of the constitutional rights of the inmate.
iii. The individual who is "invited" to the police station by
police officers or is told that he may leave at will
Of all the aspects of the issue of custodial interrogation, the
cases in which the subject has been "invited" to the station for
questioning are by far the least protective of individual rights.
Indeed, some of the decisions in this area are nothing short of
amazing. The theory seems to be that if an individual is not
compelled to submit to station house interrogation and is physi-
cally free to leave, then there can be no custody. A consideration
of several cases will demonstrate that this theory does not always
hold true.
People v. Burris,'" is a glaring example of the misapplication
of Miranda. Here the police were investigating a murder and had
a witness who could place Burris at the scene at approximately
the time of the murder. Further, the police found the body of the
victim in the defendant's automobile. Burris, knowing that the
police already had this strong evidence against him, "agreed" to
go to the station for questioning. No force was used by the offi-
cers, presumably because no resistance was offered by Burris.
The interrogation at the station house continued until the defen-
dant had incriminated himself, at which time he was informed
of his rights, waived them, and went through the now meaning-
less task of giving a full confession. The statements were held
admissible because the defendant's initial confrontation with the
police was "voluntary." He had agreed to come to the station for
questioning, and therefore the Illinois Supreme Court found that
Miranda warnings were unnecessary. It is difficult to imagine
that any man-reasonable or otherwise-who knows the police
can place him at the scene of the crime, and in whose automobile
the corpse of the victim was found, would feel that his interroga-
tion is totally voluntary. Burris was interrogated in an unfamiliar,
police-dominated station house, regarding a murder in which the
144. 49 I1, 2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605 (1971).
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state already possessed damning evidence against him, and yet
he was found not to be in custody.
A similar case is Meyer v. Commonwealth,4 ' in which the
defendant was likewise "invited" to come to the station house for
questioning. The defendant spent fourteen hours at the station.
He was questioned extensively. He consented to searches of his
property and chemical tests on bloodstains found in his automo-
bile. Only after the blood was determined to be that of the victim,
was Meyer warned of his rights, whereupon he confessed. Meyer's
statements and all evidence stemming from those statements
were held to be admissible, as the court found the entire fourteen
hour session to be non-custodial.
Both Burris and Meyer were based in part on dictum by the
United States Supreme Court in Morales v. New York. 4' In
Morales, the Court raised the possibility that confessions result-
ing from interrogations without probable cause to arrest might be
admissible at a lower standard. The Court, however, refused to
consider the issue on the record of the case before it. This dictum
would seem weak grounds on which to legitimate the procedures
mentioned above. If the Supreme Court had chosen to recognize
such a rule, it has certainly had many opportunities to do so since
the Morales decision. Further, it is doubtful that such a rule, even
if constitutionally permissible, would have applied to the
interrogation in Burris. The evidence obtained against Burris
prior to his questioning would seem to have constituted probable
cause for even the most conservative police officer. As for Meyer,
the circumstances of the fourteen hour station house investiga-
tion, complete with searches and chemical tests, would appear to
cast grave doubt on the prima facie voluntariness of the encoun-
ter and especially the contention that Meyer was at all times free
to leave.
Unfortunately, Burris and Meyer do not stand alone as judi-
cial justification of questionable station house interrogation. In
People v. Yukl, '" 7 the New York Court of Appeals found at-the-
station interrogation lasting from two-thirty or three a.m. until
six-thirty a.m. to be non-custodial. The questioning had contin-
ued without benefit of Miranda warnings until, during the course
145. 472 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1971).
146. 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
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of an apparent strip search and body examination, the officers
found fecal matter on the jockey shorts and genitals of the defen-
dant. At this point, the evidence of rape-murder was quite strong
and Miranda warnings were given. 4' All questioning before the
actual discovery of the real evidence was non-custodial. A similar
decision was reached in Freije v. United States,'49 on the ground
that the defendant was given the choice of being questioned at
his home or at the police station.' 0
A more rational decision in which at-the-station interroga-
tion was found to be non-custodial is United States v. Scully.'
5
1
In this case, the subject was informed that he was under suspicion
and was requested to come to the station for questioning. He was
also informed that he was not required to undergo the interroga-
tion and was free to leave at any time. During the course of the
encounter, Scully decided to break off the questioning and depart
the station, which he was allowed to do freely. The whole tenor
of this investigation is set by the fact that he was informed of his
right to terminate the interrogation and that he was under suspi-
cion. Such a situation would seem much more conducive to the
exercise of fifth amendment rights than the obviously coercive
atmosphere in Burris. A similar situation was found non-
custodial in United States v. Manglona'5 2 where the subject did
not choose to break off the questioning, though he had been in-
formed of his right to do so. This would seem consistent with
Miranda, since the emphasis is on knowledge of rights, not the
invocation of them.
There are, of course, decisions in which the "invited" subject
has been found to have been in custody. As shown by People v.
Yukl1 3 and Fisher v. Scafati,54 a non-custodial interrogation of an
invited subject may become custodial at the point where officers
obtain strong evidence against the individual.'5 5 Beyond this
factor, some extraordinary circumstance must be present before
148. See also Fisher v. Scafati, 439 F.2d 307 (1st Cir. 1971).
149. 408 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1969).
150, The defendant was not offered the option of foregoing the interrogation.
151. 415 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1969).
152. 414 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1969).
153. 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
851 (1970).
154. 439 F.2d 307 (1st Cir. 1971).
155. This reasoning suggests that the courts are relying on the focus test. Alterna-
tively, the bodily evidence might be regarded as an objective circumstance which would
lead the defendant to know his freedom of action would be restrained.
[Vol. 25
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an individual who agrees to "voluntary" questioning will be found
to be in custody.
Another circumstance which has led to the finding of custody
is that the defendant may have been deceived into submitting to
the interrogation. In Pemberton v. Peyton,"6 an arrest warrant for
the subject was outstanding at the time of the questioning. With-
out using the warrant, the police asked the man if he would travel
sixty-five miles with them to undergo a lie detector test. He
agreed. At some point during the trip the officers carried on an
interrogation which produced incriminating statements. The
court held these statements to be inadmissible absent warnings
and waiver, as the defendant was deemed to have been in custody
at the time.
Another circumstance in which the statements of an invited
suspect are found inadmissible is the situation in which he is
asked physically to bring in evidence against himself. This
situation is seen most clearly in United States v. Casias,15 where
a young man was having difficulties with his draft classification.
After prior contacts with the selective service board in an at-
tempt to change his classification, the man was requested to come
to the board's office and bring his last classification notice. He
did so, and the state attempted to introduce this notice as evi-
dence against him in a criminal prosecution. At the time he was
requested to produce the notice, the defendant apparently be-
lieved that the board was still considering reclassification. In real-
ity, the only purpose of the request was to prove the defendant's
knowledge of his prior classification in order to convict him of
violating selective service laws. By relying on the focus test, the
court held that Miranda warnings were required since the investi-
gation had shifted to an attempt to convict the subject. The same
result was reached in United States v. Pellegrini'll by use of the
objective test. Police officers requested Pellegrini to go to his
home and return with certain evidence for use in his prosecution.
This was held to be custodial since Pellegrini acknowledged the
evidence to be at his home, was closely followed by the arresting
officers, and thus could reasonably believe that he had to cooper-
ate.
In summary, many courts seem willing to afford a great deal
156. 288 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Va. 1968).
157. 306 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1969); see also 23 VAND. L. Rsv. 892 (1970).
158. 309 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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of latitude to the police when dealing with subjects who have been
"invited" to the station house for questioning. Although Miranda
clearly does not apply to the citizen who rushes in off the street
to confess,159 its non-application to this area is less justifiable. An
individual "requested" to come to the station is subjected to the
same coercive atmosphere and tactics as the person placed under
arrest. Further, the refusal of the courts to use the subjective test
as to custody allows the police to interrogate some individuals
who believe themselves to be under arrest and to subject these
persons to the police-dominated atmosphere of the station house
-i.e., to the same conditions present in Miranda without any
warnings whatsoever. Professor Graham's theory of "ignorance
compulsion"'' 0 is especially applicable in this area. The igno-
rant defendant may see the police request as an order which
he cannot refuse, and thus be in custody as effectively as if he
were handcuffed. This reasoning led Professor Graham to the
conclusion that all who were asked to come to the police station
for questioning should be given Miranda warnings."' This conclu-
sion seems to be justified in the light of Miranda's emphasis on




After considering the cases and authorities on the subject as
they relate to specific factual situations, perhaps it is appropriate
to review and note any trends which may have become apparent.
After so doing, the trends should be measured by the purposes of
the Miranda decision as suggested in the introduction to this
article.
First, the trend has been toward a more universal application
of the objective test as the measuring test of custodial interroga-
tion. Insofar as this trend has been a rejection of the focus test,
it would seem to be a healthy one. There are numerous examples
of cases in which the individual is in custody in a very real sense,
but where the investigation has not focused on him within the
meaning of Escobedo. Insofar as the trend is a rejection of the
subjective test, it must be deemed a compromise with practical-
159. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
160. Graham, supra note 9, at 79-80.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 82-83.
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ity. The subjective test is obviously the most logical way to deter-
mine whether a person might be coerced by what he believes to
be a custodial situation. It would be an enormous burden, how-
ever, to require police officers to foresee the personal frailties and
characteristics of each individual whom they question. Neverthe-
less, the subjective test should be used whenever practical in
order to protect better the individual.
As to the various factual situations, the trend in on-the-scene
questioning is clearly to admit a great number of statements.
This basic pattern is consistent with the language' 3 and overall
theory of Miranda. The atmosphere and necessity for immediate
police action on the scene are different from the police station
situation. The possibility of on-the-scene coercive measures is
less. This is not to say, however, that the coercive nature of a
police station cannot be duplicated outside the station. "Igno-
rance compulsion" may cause an individual to incriminate him-
self just as quickly on the street as in jail.'64 Similarly, an individ-
ual detained by a police officer in a secluded spot may be just as
isolated and just as deserving of the Miranda warnings as his
counterpart in the interrogation room. The place of the interroga-
tion alone cannot be controlling.'65 The place of interrogation has
meaning only when considered in the context of the totality of the
circumstances. Thus, if a suspect has been deprived of his free-
dom of action before or during his interrogation, Miranda should
apply even though the questioning takes place "on the scene."
In cases where a person is interrogated in his own home or
business, statements obtained without Miranda warnings are in-
admissible if the subject was in custody. The United States Su-
preme Court made this clear in Orozco."'6 The custody need not
be lengthy, nor must actual force be used. Orozco is clear prece-
dent for application to most at-home interrogations. Unfortu-
nately, many lower courts seem intent on raising the standard
of Orozco or finding exceptions to its rule. The logic behind this
approach is not sound. Although the defendant's home is more
familiar to him than is the police station, it can quickly become
police-dominated by the entry of several police officers. An indi-
vidual may be held for incommunicado interrogation just as effec-
163. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
164. Graham, supra note 9, at 76-78.
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tively in his own home as anywhere else. Additionally, an individ-
ual might well fear that the tactics of lower grade officers would
be more coercive while outside the view and control of their supe-
riors. There is a wide spectrum of possible situations involving
police interrogations at defendants' homes, ranging from a casual
exchange on the front lawn to armed entry and interrogation in
the dead of night. While a relaxation of Miranda may be appro-
priate in the former, the latter situation should require protec-
tions as extensive as any afforded by other contacts with police
officers.
At the police station, the law clearly does not require that
warnings be given to those who rush in off the street to confess.
Conversely, warnings are required when a person is arrested and
brought in for questioning. Between these two extremes lies a
great mass of Miranda litigation. Where a person voluntarily
comes to the police and initiates discussion on the subject of a
particular crime, he does so without any requirements of warning.
This rule, while questionable in theory, is workable in fact. Those
guilty of crimes who initiate contact with the police in order to
mislead them and clear themselves have practically, if not tech-
nically, waived the right against self-incrimination. The coercive
atmosphere of the police station is viewed by them as a gauntlet
which they have chosen to run in order to retain their freedom.
Most courts will gladly let them run it.
As to those in custody on charges other than the one for
which they are being interrogated, Miranda warnings should be
given. The restraints on freedom of action and the coercive nature
of the place are not lessened by the fact that the individual has
been a prisoner for some time or that he was placed there for some
unrelated reason.17 The reasoning of the Supreme Court on this
point in Mathis"" seems completely consistent with the purpose
of Miranda. Finally, the language, though not the holding, of the
Second Circuit in the Attica case '69 shows the prospect of a new
rule requiring greater protections of the right against self-
incrimination for those in custody. Such a rule would seem con-
sistent with the Miranda purposes of overcoming the compelling
atmosphere and potential police abuses inherent in the station
house. The oppressiveness and the opportunities for retaliation
167. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
168. Id.
169. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
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which are inherent to a correctional institute are so immensely
greater than corresponding dangers at the local station house that
a similarly greater degree of protection would seem necessary.
The single area of the law in which the purposes of Miranda
have been most subverted, if not ignored, is that of the individual
who is "invited" to come in for questioning. The pressures on this
individual can be, and usually are, just as great as those on his
counterpart under arrest. Whether he agrees to the interrogation
because of "ignorance compulsion," a mistaken belief that he is
under arrest, or because he thinks he can clear himself, his situa-
tion is not so dissimilar from that of a person under arrest as to
justify the results of the several cases previously discussed. It
would appear that the only way a uniform application of Miranda
will be achieved to protect the rights of these individuals is by a
ruling of the United States Supreme Court. It is to be hoped that
the Court will consider and clarify this problem in the near fu-
ture.
The application of Miranda by the lower federal and state
courts may be viewed as a continuing battle between the rights
of the individual and the real or supposed needs of law enforce-
ment. Some would say that Miranda struck the balance too far
in favor of individual liberties while hamstringing the efforts of
the police. Others would assert that the balance was already so
heavily weighted in favor of law enforcement that Miranda is only
a first step in setting the scales right. An overall evaluation of the
performance of our courts in applying Miranda to the question of
custodial interrogation is necessarily influenced by one's personal
view of this struggle. The courts, on the whole, have'conscien-
tiously interpreted Miranda in those cases where it clearly ap-
plies, and have extended it only in the most niggardly fashion.
Whatever one's subjective evaluation of this performance, all
should agree with the view of Rothblatt and Pitler:
Only through the scrupulous observance of constitutional rights
of citizens and the mutual cooperation of law enforcement offi-
cials and defense attorneys can our system of criminal justice
provide for effective law enforcement and at the same time pre-
serve human rights and dignity.'70
170. Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 64, at 498.
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